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Abstract
Historically, when an economy emerges from recession, employment
grows with, or soon after, the resumption of GDP growth. However,
following the two most recent recessions in the United States, employ-
ment growth has lagged the recovery in GDP by several quarters, a
phenomenon thathas been termed the “jobless recovery.”
To many, a jobless recovery deﬁes explanation since it violates both
historical patterns and the predictions of traditional macro theory. We
show that a recession followed by a jobless recovery is precisely what
neoclassical theory predicts when new technology impacts diﬀerent sec-
tors of the economy unevenly and is slow to diﬀuse, and sectoral ad-
justments in the labor market take time to unfold.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the familiar business cycle facts is that when an economy emerges
from recession, employment tends to grow either contemporaneously with, or
soon after, the recovery in GDP growth; indeed, this is part of the motivation
for Lucas’ (1982) famous declaration that “business cycles are all alike.” But
this key fact appears to be changing. Figure 1 plots the time path for real
GDP (per adult) and employment (per adult) for the United States over the
last thirty years (1972.4 — 2003.2). The sample period covers ﬁve periods
of declining GDP and employment. While employment invariably begins
to fall along with GDP, in the ﬁrst three recoveries employment growth
∗We would like to thank the conference participants at the 2004 SED meetings in
Florence and the 2004 Canadian Macro Study Group in Montreal. In particular, we
would like to thank Jonas Fisher for his many helpful comments and criticisms. Andolfatto
acknowledges the ﬁnancial support of SSHRCC.
1resumes almost immediately, i.e., within one or two quarters after GDP
growth turns positive. However, during the two most recent recessions,
employment growth has lagged the economic recovery by several quarters,
leaving observers to puzzle over a phenomenon that has been labeled the
“jobless recovery.” (The jobless recoveries are shaded in the Figure.)
The phenomenon of an extended jobless recovery seems, to some, hard to
understand since it violates both historical patterns and the predictions of
familiar macroeconomic wisdom. In particular, a conventional view assumes
that “aggregate demand” drives growth during a recovery. Since a major
component of demand stems from the consumer, and since a major com-
ponent of household income comprises labor earnings, it is plausible that
the prospect of employment growth fuels the economic recovery. Lack of
employment growth during a recovery is, therefore, problematic from this
perspective. Some are even led to question whether a recovery in GDP is
sustainable in the absence of employment growth. For example, according
to Weller (2004): “Economic growth is more broad based than just a few
quarters ago, with all economic industries contributing, which helps to sta-
bilize and solidify the recovery. To maintain this momentum, though, the
labor market has to improve. Otherwise, consumption, which comprises the
vast majority of the economy, will not be able to grow at a strong pace,
possibly putting a damper on growth in the medium-term.” Naturally, this
way of looking at the jobless recovery inﬂuences discussions of economic
policy. For example, Bernstein (2003) writes “The jobs picture is so serious
that steps to stimulate the economy and generate job growth are urgently
needed. Any stimulus proposal should be evaluated primarily on its impact
on job creation and its ability to reverse the current trend of weakening wage
growth.”
A jobless recovery, as a matter of arithmetic, obviously implies growth
in labor productivity, which is generally viewed as a positive development.
But some take the view that increases in labor productivity may have unde-
sirable consequences in the short-run. For example, according to Governor
Ben Bernanke (2003): “Strong productivity growth provides major beneﬁts
to the economy in the longer term, including higher real incomes and more
eﬃcient and competitive industries. But in the past couple of years, given
erratic growth in ﬁnal demand, it has also enabled ﬁrms to meet the de-
mand for their output without hiring new workers. Thus, in the short run,
productivity gains, coupled with growth in aggregate demand that has been
insuﬃcient to match the expansion in aggregate supply, have contributed to
the slowness of the recovery of the labor market.”
2We see several problems with explanations like those oﬀered by Bernanke.
First, the explanation takes as given an “insuﬃcient and erratic growth in
ﬁnal demand.” Even assuming that ﬁnal demand is a well-deﬁned concept,
why should its growth be insuﬃcient and erratic? Leaving aside the issue of
its erratic nature, one possible explanation for the “insuﬃciency‘’ of aggre-
gate demand is “sticky” product prices. If prices are sticky, then a period of
rapid productivity growth increases proﬁt margins and allows ﬁrms to meet
available demand with fewer workers. But this explanation is implausible
since it requires a degree of price stickiness (i.e., several quarters) that is
inconsistent with the data; e.g., see Bils and Klenow (2002).
Our explanation for the jobless recovery is based on the following three
assumptions: (1) Technological innovations vary in their size and scope,
where “scope” refers to the breadth of potential applicability of the new tech-
nology across various ﬁrms; (2) New technology takes time and resources to
diﬀuse; and (3) Labor cannot be instantaneously reallocated across diﬀerent
ﬁrms.1 These assumptions are neither new nor, do we think, controversial.
Greenwood, MacDonald and Zhang (1996) develop a real business cycle
model that embeds assumptions (1) and (3), with ﬁrms interpreted as con-
ventionally deﬁned sectors. As with any framework that appeals primarily
to a costly labor market adjustment mechanism, output and employment
in that model share similar transition dynamics, ruling out a jobless recov-
ery. In Andolfatto and MacDonald (1998) we investigated the properties of
a neoclassical growth model that embeds assumption (2), and showed how
the arrival and slow diﬀusion of new technology can generate booms and
slowdowns in output that are consistent with the data. However, since in-
tertemporal substitution is the only source of employment dynamics in that
model, it has limited success in accounting for employment dynamics, and
shows little promise of explaining a jobless recovery. No one, to our knowl-
edge, has investigated the implications of these assumptions taken jointly
within the context of a business cycle model. When we do this, we ﬁnd that
not only is neoclassical theory consistent with the phenomenon of a jobless
recovery, but it also oﬀers an explanation as to how technological advances
1We use the terminology “ﬁrms” to refer to a variety of economic entities that might
be aﬀected by new technology. The reader can substitute “occupation”, “industry”, or
“sector” if that seems more appropriate. But whatever the terminology, it is important
to recognize that the scope of new technology may not match, e.g., the BLS deﬁnition
of any particular occupation, or correspond to any particular SIC code. For example, an
innovation based on bioluminescence will have impact on many occupations and industries
conventionally deﬁned, but there is no aggregate, e.g., manufacturing, that corresponds
to these occupations and industries.
3may lead to the recession that precedes the jobless recovery. As will become
apparent, the model does not have to be “unusual”, or its parameter values
“extreme”, for it to produce a quantitatively signiﬁcant jobless recovery. We
also show that (1) - (3) must all be present if a jobless recovery is to occur.
The basic economics is as follows. Suppose a new technology arrives,
and, per assumption (1), it has more potential to impact some ﬁrms more
than others. Because, per assumption (2), the new technology does not dif-
fuse instantaneously, it is initially applied by very few ﬁrms. But there are
many other ﬁrms that are eager to learn and implement it. To the extent
that implementation is endogenous and costly, resources are diverted away
from production toward general “learning activities.” This diversion itself,
along the lines of our earlier work, may lead to some contraction of output
in the impacted ﬁrms. At the same time, the prospect of future productivity
growth in those ﬁrms that may potentially beneﬁt from the new technology
begins to attract workers from ﬁrms outside the scope of the new technology.
But, per assumption (3), reallocating labor across ﬁrms is costly and entails
a period of unemployment for some workers. Since technology is slow to dif-
fuse, initially, overall productivity does not rise greatly. Thus, the diversion
of labor away from productive activities (at ﬁrms within the scope who di-
vert labor toward technology implementation activities) and the increase in
unemployment (from ﬁrms outside the scope) leads to an initial contraction
in GDP. As in our earlier work, the new technology subsequently spreads
like a contagion. When this picks up, productivity begins to rise rapidly,
and the labor market “restructuring” accelerates. The rapid growth in pro-
ductivity more than makes up for the overall decline in employment, so that
the economy experiences a “jobless recovery.” Eventually, the pace of labor
reallocation begins to decline and employment begins to recover. Produc-
tivity growth remains positive, but slows as the new technology approaches
full absorption. At this phase of the cycle, both output and employment
are growing, i.e., the economy enters into a full expansion phase (with ﬁrms
outside the scope continuing to suﬀer). The cycle completes its course as
the new technology is fully implemented. At this stage, both output and
employment growth approach their normal levels.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the
basics of the economic environment. Section 3 details the assumptions we
make concerning the economy’s adjustment technologies. Section 4 then an-
alyzes the optimizing behavior of workers and ﬁrms, and characterizes the
economy’s general equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the model’s parameter-
ization. Section 6 reports the economy’s response to a technology shock
4under the benchmark parameterization and shows that the model easily de-
livers quantitatively important jobless recoveries in response to technology
change that impacts productive capabilities unevenly. Sensitivity analysis
in Section 7 conﬁrms that all of limited scope, slow diﬀusion, and nontrivial
search are required for a jobless recovery, and also reveals that the extent and
duration of such recoveries depends primarily on the scope of the technology
shock. Section 8 concludes.
2B a s i c s
Time is discrete and the horizon inﬁnite; t =0 ,1,...The economy is popu-
lated by a unit mass of inﬁnitely-lived individuals. Individuals have identical
preferences deﬁned over stochastic consumption proﬁles {ct | t ≥ 0}. Prefer-





where 0 <β<1. We will focus on perfect foresight equilibrium, so the
expectations operator E0 reﬂects only the presence of agent-speciﬁc uncer-
tainty. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time, which we will
assume is devoted either to working (in either production or learning) or
searching.
We will be concerned with technology change that impacts various parts
of the economy diﬀerentially. To model this we assume a unit continuum of
ﬁrms where each ﬁrm is endowed with k>0 units of a ﬁrm-speciﬁcf a c t o r
of production; e.g., immobile land or capital. (Keep in mind that what we
label here as a ﬁrm may in fact be better thought of as a plant or occupation;
i.e., in the data, a ﬁrm may consist of several plants and/or occupations.)
Since k is distributed uniformly over the unit interval, k represents both the
aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc quantity of the ﬁxed factor. For simplicity, we
assume that each individual owns an equal share of the economy-wide stock
k.2
Production at every ﬁrm is described by the neoclassical production
technology y = F(k,n), where y denotes (homogeneous and nonstorable)
output, k denotes the ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor, n denotes the level of employment,
2T h eo n l ys u b s t a n t i v er o l ek plays in the analysis is to distribute proﬁts. The reader
can assume, as we do for the numerical analysis, k ≡ 1 if desired.
5and F is linear homogeneous and so has diminishing marginal product in
each factor.
If labor is freely mobile across ﬁrms, the equilibrium wage at each date
and ﬁrm is w0 = Fn(k,1), with the population distributed uniformly across
ﬁrms. Consumption and output for each individual is c = y = F(k,1).
2.1 Technological innovation
Suppose the allocation just described is the economy’s “initial” position.
Then, at some date, which we will label t =0 , a major new technology is
discovered that, if implemented, improves production possibilities at some
fraction µ (0 <µ≤ 1)o fﬁrms. The parameter µ indexes the scope of the
new technology. If implemented at some ﬁrm within the scope, new tech-
nology augments the productivity of k by the factor γ (γ>1); production
possibilities at these ﬁrms becomes y = F(γk,n). The parameter γ indexes
the size of the technological improvement. Together, scope and size will de-
termine the economy’s long-run potential GDP. Call the set of ﬁrms where
production possibilities have improved sector 1,a n dt h er e s tsector 2.
We think of the arrival of major new technology, e.g., microelectronics or
the Internet, as occurring infrequently, and, for simplicity, model this as the
arrival being completely unanticipated. Expectations along the adjustment
path subsequent to the arrival of a technological breakthrough, however, are
assumed fully rational. As there is no aggregate uncertainty, the equilibrium
dynamics subsequent to the technology shock will follow a perfect foresight
path.
Let n(j) denote the level of employment at a ﬁrm located in sector
j, j =1 ,2. If the economy could adjust instantly to the new technology,
then the new equilibrium would be characterized by the following conditions
(asterisks denote equilibrium values):
w∗ = Fn(γk,n∗(1))
w∗ = Fn(k,n∗(2))
1=µn∗(1) + (1 − µ)n∗(2)
y∗ = µF(γk,n∗(1)) + (1 − µ)F(k,n∗(2))
The ﬁrst two conditions describe ﬁrms’ optimizing choice of labor in each
sector; the others describe market clearing in the labor and goods markets
respectively. Clearly, n∗(1) >n ∗(2), so w∗ >w 0. That is, while employment
6in sector 1 expands at the expense of sector 2, since individuals are identical,
equilibrium requires that they share equally in the higher wages induced
by the new technology. Note that while labor productivity rises in both
industries, it does so for very diﬀerent reasons. In sector 1, a more eﬃcient
technology makes labor more productive. In sector 2, productivity rises
because the capital-labor ratio increases.
3 Adjustment technologies
Realistically, it takes time and eﬀort for ﬁrms to adopt major new ideas,
and workers moving to more attractive jobs/occupations is not free either.
To describe this process, we introduce two “adjustment technologies”.
3.1 Job search
We assume labor is perfectly mobile within a sector, but not across sectors.
An individual who attempts to gain employment in a diﬀerent sector fails
to do so with probability 0 <φ<1. Given failure, the individual foregoes
his wage for one period. Then, the individual has the option of working
in the sector in which he worked previously, or trying to switch sectors.
Conditional on success, the individual immediately earns the competitive
wage in his new sector.
To describe how the size of the workforce evolves in each sector, we
anticipate some equilibrium behavior, viz., that no individual would choose
to leave a ﬁrm within the scope of the technology shock. Thus, any ﬁrm
in sector 1 will generally attract workers from outside the scope, so the
workforce will typically be expanding in sector 1 and contracting in sector
2.
Let xt(j) denote the workforce (i.e., those who might work or search) per
ﬁrm in sector j. Since we anticipate that no worker in sector 1 will search, let
ut denote the number of individuals per sector 2 ﬁrm who elect to search.
Then total unemployment is simply (1 − µ)ut, and there are (1 − µ)ut/µ
searchers per sector 1 ﬁrm. It follows that the per ﬁrm workforce within
each sector evolves according to:






xt+1(2) = xt(2) − (1 − φ)ut.
Since, there is a unit mass of workers, we must have
µxt(1) + (1 − µ)xt(2) = 1.
3.2 Technology diﬀusion
Following Andolfatto and MacDonald (1998), when news of the new tech-
nology arrives, ﬁr m si ns e c t o r1l e a r nt h e yh a v et h epotential to beneﬁt,
but generally must undertake costly activities to implement the new tech-
nology. That is, there is a diﬀerence between understanding the availability
of a technology and actually learning how to implement it. Let λt denote
the fraction of sector 1 ﬁrms that have learned how to implement the new
technology. Firms in sector 1 are then labelled either high-tech or low-tech
depending on whether they have implemented the new technology. For sim-
plicity, suppose that when the new technology arrives, some (small) fraction
λ0 > 0 of ﬁrms in industry 1 learn the new technology immediately and
costlessly; we will treat λ0 as a parameter.3
Assume that learning to implement the new technology takes time and
resources, and is not fully predictable (at the ﬁrm level). Let ιt denote
imitation eﬀort, speciﬁcally the number of workers employed in the learning
process at a representative low-tech ﬁrm (high-tech ﬁrms will devote no
resources to learning). These workers must be paid a competitive wage.
Given ιt, a low-tech ﬁrm successfully learns the technology, and so can use it
in subsequent periods, with probability ξ(ι)λt, where ξ(0) = 0,0 ≤ ξ<1 and
ξ0 > 0 >ξ 00. The law of motion that describes the pattern of diﬀusion is
then:
λt+1 = λt +( 1− λt)ξ(ιt)λt. (2)
3The assumption that an exogenous λ0 > 0 ﬁrms learn is merely a convenience that
allows us to model the diﬀusion of new technology exclusively as “imitation”, i.e., low
tech ﬁrms learning from high tech, rather than as a blend of imitation and “innovation”,
the latter meaning ﬁrms can learn independently of others. If λ0 =0 , imitation-based
diﬀusion cannot begin. Allowing λ0 =0and innovation can also be accommodated along
the lines of Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994).
8Notice that the technology of learning is speciﬁed so that it becomes eas-
ier for a ﬁrm to adopt the new technology when others have already done
so. The idea is that a new technology becomes progressively easier to learn
the more widely it is in use because there is more commonly-known experi-
ence with learning how to implement the new technology. Accordingly, the
diﬀusion of technology will follow the familiar S-shaped pattern.
4 Individual optimization and equilibrium
In this section we characterize optimal behavior for individuals and ﬁrms.
Since we are modelling behavior following the arrival of the new technology,
and individuals expect no further technology shocks, there is no aggregate
uncertainty. Accordingly, when forming their decisions, individuals take as
given a vector of deterministic sequences describing the evolution of real
wages and the distribution of knowledge.
4.1 Firms
Let wt(i) denote the real wage in sector i at date t. We distinguish between
high-tech and low-tech ﬁrms with superscripts H or L.D e ﬁne:
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For all ﬁrms, choosing employment devoted to production in each period
coincides with optimal behavior. The only dynamic choice is faced by the
low-tech ﬁrms who must also decide on the extent of eﬀort to learn the new
technology, ιt.
Let V H
t (1) and V L
t (1) denote the capital value of optimizing high- and
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t (1) + βV H
t+1(1), (4)
and the sequence {V L
t (1)}∞
t=0 satisﬁes, for all t:
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t (1), the condition describing the optimal level of








Optimal learning eﬀort is increasing in the expected discounted capital gain
associated with success, β
£
V H
t+1(1) − V L
t+1(1)
¤
, a n di nt h ec u r r e n ts t a t eo f
technology absorption λt. Likewise, optimal learning eﬀort decreases with
the cost, wt(1), of employing workers in such an activity.
4.2 Workers
Let Jt(j) denote the capital value associated with an individual who is em-
ployed in sector j at date t. Since individuals who work in production earn
the same wage as those employed in learning activities, we need not dis-
tinguish between the two. Similarly, let Qt denote a searcher’s (necessarily
from sector 2) capital value. Anticipating that Jt(1) ≥ Qt and Jt(1) ≥ Jt(2),
these capital values must satisfy:
Jt(1) = wt(1) + βJt+1(1) (7)
Jt(2) = wt(2) + β max{Jt+1(2),Q t+1}
Qt =( 1 − φ)Jt(1) + φβ max{Jt+1(2),Q t+1}
The choice problem facing individuals in sector 2 is simple: if Jt(2) ≥ Qt,
then search; otherwise, remain working in sector 2.
4.3 Equilibrium




t (1) + (1 − λt)(nL
t (1) + ιt
¤
+( 1− µ)(1 − φ)ut. (8)
The ﬁnal term in the expression above represents the ﬂow of individuals who
successfully make a transition from sector 2 into the sector 1 labor market.
At the same time, the sector 2 labor market must also obey
(1 − µ)xt(2) = (1 − µ)[nt(2) + φut]. (9)
Of course, (8) and (9) must agree with (3.1).
10Optimization by ﬁrms gives:
wt(1) = Fn(γ,nH
t (1)) = Fn(1,n L
t (1));
wt(2) = Fn(1,n t(2));
in addition to condition (6).
Along the equilibrium path, unemployment will either be strictly posi-
tive or equal to zero. For strictly positive unemployment rates, individuals
in sector 2 must be just indiﬀerent between working sector 2 or searching
for employment in sector 1; otherwise, working in sector 2 must dominate
search. That is
ut > 0 implies Jt(2) = Qt
and
ut =0implies Jt(2) ≥ Qt.
An equilibrium for this economy is a set of sequences:
©




t (1),J t(1),J t(2),Q t
ª∞
t=0
and an initial condition (x0(1),x 0(2),λ 0) satisfying:
1. Individual optimization:g i v e n {wt(1),w t(2)}
∞
t=0, the sequences {Jt(1),J t(2),Q t}∞
t=0
satisfy equation (7);
2. Firm optimization:g i v e n{wt(1),w t(2),λ t}
∞
t=0 , the sequences {nH
t (1),n L





t=0 satisfy equations (3), (4), (5) and (6);
3. Labor market clearing: (1), (3.1), (8) and (9) hold at every t;
4. Search evolution: (4.3) and (4.3) hold at every t;a n d
5. Technology evolution:( 2 )h o l d sa te v e r yt.
5 Parameterization





where χ =1if the new technology has been implemented; χ =0otherwise.
Taking a time interval to be one year, we assume a commonly-employed
value for the discount factor, β =0 .96. We set α =0 .36, implying a long run
labor share of income equal to .64. The search failure probability is φ =0 .50,
so that workers who choose to switch occupations have a 50% chance of doing
so successfully within one year; we explore the consequences of higher and
lower values below. The parameter η governs the speed at which the new
technology diﬀuses. Setting η =2 5implies that it takes several years for
a new technology to diﬀuse fully; results will also be reported for diﬀerent
diﬀusion rates. Finally, we set k =1 .
The initial conditions are such that all ﬁrms share the same technology.
Thus, when the new technology arrives, since search takes at least one pe-
riod, all ﬁrms have the same initial workforce; i.e., x0(1) = x0(2) = 1.0.
When the new technology arrives, we assume 1% of ﬁrms within the scope
immediately understand how to implement it, λ0 =0 .01.
The two remaining parameters describe size (γ) and scope (µ) of the new
technology. Assuming that new technologies are eventually fully absorbed,
these two parameters dictate the long-run increase in real per capita GDP.
Below, we will consider diﬀerent conﬁgurations of these parameters, with
each conﬁguration generating a long-run increase in real GDP equal to about
20%. In our benchmark parameterization, we set µ =0 .25 and γ =3 .75.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Benchmark parameterization
The initial situation features full employment, with sector 1 and 2 employ-
ment shares equal to .25 and .75, respectively. The initial wage rate is the
same in each sectors, and equal to .64 (labor’s share of initial output, which
is normalized to unity).
The technology shock is narrow in scope, being (potentially) available
to only 25% of ﬁrms. But for these ﬁrms, successful implementation of the
new technology increases productivity by just over 60% (i.e., by a factor
of γa =3 .750.36). On impact, however, only 1% of ﬁrms in the favorably-
aﬀected sector are able to implement the new technology immediately. Thus,
12the initial impact on economy-wide TFP is miniscule.
The top panel of Figure 2 displays the post-innovation time path of em-
ployment by sector, as well as unemployment. The bottom panel of Figure 2
displays the time path of wage rates and labor’s share of income. At the out-
set, new technology does little to stimulate restructuring; unemployments
remains at its normal level for two periods following the shock. Wages paid
by ﬁrms within the scope, however, begin to rise almost immediately, albeit
at a modest rate. The resulting “wage gap” across ﬁrms within and outside
the scope eventually makes it attractive for some workers to invest in search.
The pace of restructuring begins to increase substantially four or ﬁve
periods following impact. At this stage, the new technology is beginning
to diﬀuse very quickly across ﬁrms within the scope. The rapid increase in
productivity among the favorably aﬀected ﬁrms increases their demand for
labor, which continues to put upward pressure on the real wage. Workers
currently located at ﬁrms outside the scope are attracted by the high wages
being paid elsewhere, which is what accounts for the signiﬁcant rise in un-
employment. Notice that the drain of workers from ﬁrms outside the scope
compels these ﬁrms to accept wage increases that are consistent with some
workers continuing to work for these ﬁrms; thus, proﬁts at these establish-
ments decline. (“New” and “old” economy examples come to mind.)
Despite the fact that workers are able to switch occupations with mod-
erate ease, the dynamics of this process are drawn out for several periods
o w i n gt ot h es l o wd i ﬀusion of technology. Unemployment peaks a full nine
periods following the arrival of the technology shock. Eventually, the re-
structuring process completes its course after fourteen periods have passed.
At this stage, those ﬁrms within the scope, which comprises 25% of all ﬁrms
in the economy, employ over 50% of the workforce.
Figure 3 displays the time paths of GDP growth and employment growth.
Notice that the arrival of the new technology initially generates a brief/mild
recession (or, at least a growth slowdown). This initial decline in output
occurs as some ﬁrms within the scope divert labor away from production
toward learning activities. Later, output declines (despite rising produc-
tivity) as learning continues and workers from outside the scope become
unemployed.
GDP growth turns positive four-ﬁve periods after the initial technology
shock. At this stage, the number of ﬁrms that have learned the new tech-
nology reaches a critical mass that makes subsequent adoption much easier
for laggards. As a result, the new technology begins to diﬀuse quickly. The
13rapid adoption of technology leads to a surge in productivity growth. This
rapid spread of new technology makes investment in search attractive and
so stimulates the pace of sectoral readjustment, and employment continues
to decline even more rapidly (as unemployment peaks). During this phase
of the adjustment process, the economy experiences a jobless recovery. As
the new technology approaches full absorption, the rate of diﬀusion must
necessarily slow. In the ﬁnal phase of the cycle, both GDP and employment
growth peak and eventually decline to their normal growth rates (zero, in
this model). This is the full expansion phase of the cycle.
6.2 Sensitivity
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results to various parameter
perturbations. In the ﬁrst experiment, we vary the parameter that governs
the ease with which workers are able to switch sectors. Figure 4 reports the
results for φ ∈ {0.0,0.25,0.50,0.70}. Recall that φ measures the probability
that search is unsuccessful.
When φ =0 , workers are able to switch occupations easily. Accordingly,
there is no jobless recovery since employment remains stable as the new
technology diﬀuses. This result justiﬁes our earlier claim that labor market
frictions are a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for a jobless recovery.
The qualitative properties of a jobless recovery appear to be robust for a wide
range of parameter values. The eﬀect of increasing the diﬃculty of switching
sectors is to shorten the jobless recovery, while increasing the amplitude in
the employment growth rate.
Now consider varying the scope of new technology, µ. Recall that µ mea-
sures the fraction of ﬁrms in the economy that may potentially beneﬁtf r o m
the technology shock. Figure 5 reports the results for µ ∈ {0.25,0.50,0.75,0.90}.
In each of these experiments, the size of the new technology, γ, is adjusted so
that in each case the long-run GDP rises by approximately the same amount
(20%). In particular, a technology shock with wider scope is smaller in size.
The top-left panel of Figure 5 records the benchmark parameterization.
The eﬀect of increasing the scope of new technology is to reduce the need
for labor market restructuring. Accordingly, we see that the severity and
length of the jobless recovery are reduced as the scope is widened. The
increasing delay in widespread diﬀusion is accounted for by the fact that
the size of the new technology is reduced as we increase its scope (so that
the private incentive to adopt the new technology is not as great). While,
14the qualitative properties of a jobless recovery remain intact for a wide
range of parameter values, as µ becomes large, the jobless recovery, and
unemployment generally, vanishes.4 This veriﬁes our earlier claim that for
a technology shock to induce a signiﬁcant jobless recovery, a necessary (but
not suﬃcient) condition is that the shock is not too broad in scope.
In the ﬁnal experiment, we vary the speed at which the new technol-
ogy diﬀuses We do this in two ways. The ﬁrst involves assuming diﬀerent
values for the initial fraction of ﬁrms (within the scope) who learn the new
technology immediately upon its arrival, as governed by the parameter λ0.
The idea here — somewhat outside the model — is to capture the notion that
for some fraction of the scope, the new technology is very similar to what
is already in use. For example, an improvement in the eﬃciency of biolu-
minescence technology may be easily implemented by ﬁrms already using
it, but that this will be more diﬃcult for ﬁrms who can eventually beneﬁt
from bioluminescence, but whose current production is not based on it, e.g.,
manufacturers of light bulbs.
Figure 6 reports the results for λ0 ∈ {0.01,0.10,0.25,1.0}.The top-left
panel of Figure 6 is the benchmark parameterization; i.e., λ0 =0 .01. Observe
how the transition dynamics are altered signiﬁcantly for even a moderate
increase in λ0. For λ0 =0 .10, the technology shock still induces a mod-
erate recession on impact followed by a brief jobless recovery. However,
when λ0 is increased to 0.25, output remains virtually unchanged on im-
pact, even though employment drops dramatically. In this case, the drop
in employment is just compensated for by the increase in productivity. The
bottom-right panel displays the limiting case where new technology is ab-
sorbed instantaneously (i.e., the standard real-business-cycle assumption).
Observe that output and employment move in opposite directions only in
the impact period of the shock. The subsequent transition dynamics are
governed entirely by the adjustment costs in the labor market, with output
and employment moving together throughout the transition period. Thus,
slow technology diﬀusion is also a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition
for a technology shock to induce a jobless recovery.
The second way we vary the speed of diﬀusion of new technology is by
assuming diﬀerent values for η. An increase in η increases the probability
that any given level of ﬁrm learning eﬀort succeeds, in which case the ﬁrm
4Of course, such a shock may still induce ﬂuctuations in the aggregate labor input, as
demonstrated by Andolfatto and MacDonald (1998) in the context of a model that endo-
genizes the labor-leisure choice. However, the point here is that a broad scope technology
shock is unlikely to induce a jobless recovery.
15implements the new technology. Figure 7 reports the results of this experi-
ment for η ∈ {7.5,10,25,500}. Interestingly, even for very high η, e.g., 500,
the jobless recovery exists. The reason is that the probability of a ﬁrm suc-
cessfully imitating at t is λtξ(ιt), approximately λt for large η. Thus, high η
implies that imitation is very likely to be successful once the technology is
widely diﬀused, but not before that. So if η is low, e.g., η =7 .5, making im-
itation diﬃcult, this slows diﬀusion and prolongs the jobless recovery. But
even very large values, e.g., η =5 0 0 , do not remove the jobless recovery,
i.e., ﬁnite η is not necessary. As we emphasized earlier, slow diﬀusion is
necessary. Any factor that removes this feature will also eliminate a jobless
recovery in our model.
7 Discussion
Our analysis suggests that a jobless recovery can be the result of a technology-
driven recession (or growth slowdown). Our explanation hinges critically on
three assumptions. First, technology advance is typically narrow in scope in
the sense that not all technology beneﬁts in the same way from innovations.
Second, conditional on a shock that alters the relative returns to diﬀerent
economic activities, it takes time for resources to adjust to these new con-
ditions. Lilien (1982) was one of the ﬁrst to stress the idea that “sectoral
shifts” in the structure of factor demands, together with costly readjust-
ment, could explain a signiﬁcant fraction of the increase in unemployment
during recessions. One problem with Lilien’s hypothesis is that the act that
there appears to be too much comovement in employment across conven-
tionally deﬁned sectors. But this may be more a problem with measurement
than theory. In particular, it is conceivable that technology shocks that are
narrow in scope alter the relative demands for diﬀerent activities (e.g., occu-
pations) within conventionally deﬁned sectors or industries. While this idea
sounds plausible, we are not aware of any data that can help us determine
whether this is descriptive.
Finally, we assume that new technologies take time to diﬀuse. There is
ample micro-level evidence that documents the well-known S-shaped diﬀu-
sion pattern of new technologies; e.g., Griliches (1957). We think it is also
reasonable to think this pattern also holds up for “general purpose tech-
nologies” (Bresnahen and Trajtenberg, 1996, and Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2003). At the macro level, Lippi and Reichlin (1994) argue that the sto-
chastic process for GDP is more plausibly modeled as an ARIMA whose
16impulse-response function follows an S-shaped pattern. Further empirical
support for this idea is reported in Beaudry and Portier (2004), who investi-
gate the joint behavior of stock prices and TFP movements. These authors
ﬁnd that business cycles appear to be driven largely by shocks that have
little impact on TFP in the short run, but a big impact on TFP in the
long-run, consistent with the way we have modeled new technology.
8C o n c l u s i o n
It is an empirical fact that the pattern of economic development in advanced
economies is characterized by growth and ﬂu c t u a t i o n si nG D P .T h er o l eo f
technological advance in generating growth is widely accepted. Real business
cycle (RBC) theory asserts that since there is no ap r i o r ireason to expect
the process of discovery to occur evenly over time, technology shocks may
b el a r g e l yr e s p o n s i b l ef o rb o t hg r o w t ha n dﬂuctuations. In standard RBC
environments, however, positive technological developments do not lead to
recessions or jobless recoveries.
In this paper we explored the properties of an RBC model in which
growth is driven by technological advances that improve factor productiv-
ity, that vary in the degree to which they aﬀect the structure of the economy,
that do not diﬀuse instantaneously, and that generate lasting labor market
adjustments. The combination of technology advance with limited scope,
less than instantaneous diﬀusion, and job search, yields income and employ-
ment dynamics that easily display recessions and jobless recoveries that are
both quantitatively important and, in a general way, similar to the jobless
recoveries whose emergence has proved so puzzling to many observers of
aggregate economic activity.
We do not claim that all technological advances lead to jobless recov-
eries. According to our theory, whether a technological advance leads to
a jobless recovery or not depends on the technology’s scope and ease of
implementation; these are parameters that are likely to vary across tech-
nological advances. And while advances in the technological frontier are
initially characterized by recessions (or growth slowdowns) in our model, we
also do not claim that all recessions are caused by technological advances.
Our assertion is that technology advance may have been a contributing (and
possibly primary) factor in some recent recessionary episodes. Other types
of shocks, notably the oil price shocks of the early 1970s could, in the context
of our model, generate a recession along with signiﬁcant labor market re-
17structuring. But because energy intensive sectors must absorb higher energy
prices almost instantaneously, such a shock can be thought of as a reduction
in TFP that diﬀuses quickly throughout the aﬀected sectors. As we have
demonstrated above, a shock that diﬀuses quickly will not generate a jobless
recovery.
Of course, this leaves open the intriguing question of what factors de-
termine the attributes of technological developments in terms of their size,
scope, and ease of implementation. The fact that, according to our scope-
based explanation of recently observed dynamics, new technology is system-
atically narrower in scope but greater in magnitude suggests the recent trend
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